High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
Over at Just Security, I have a new piece on the Washington Post's interesting story about the increasingly aggressive role some federal magistrate judges are playing in policing criminal investigations involving digital media.
Today the Fourth Circuit refrained from deciding the first legal challenge to government seizure of the master encryption keys that secure our communications with web sites and email servers. Nevertheless, the Court upheld contempt of court sanctions, because of the Lavabit owner’s foot dragging during proceedings. Lavabit had failed to raise the substantive issues below, it decided, thus precluding appellate review.
Today I filed comments with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) in connection with its hearing on section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. That law is the legal basis for the PRISM surveillance program and involves warrantless collection of communications contents via targeting non-U.S. individuals or entities reasonably believed to be located abroad. I've written previously about questions the PCLOB should investigate with regards to section 702.
Last week, the New York Times reported that the U.S. is spying on router company Huawei to get information about the Chinese government and to learn how to surveil our allies and other countries that might purchase Huawei routers. On Just Security, I refute the argument of some that it is not “in the public interest to reveal how democracies spy on dictatorships”.
Reply brief in support of January 2019 objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
"However, it's unclear how Microsoft's lawsuit will fare. It would be "premature to guess" how successful Microsoft is likely to be, Jennifer Granick, the director of civil liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, said in an email."
"n addition, defense counsel would undoubtedly demand the right for their own third-party experts to have access not only to the source code, but to further demand the right to simulate the testing environment and run this code on their own systems in order to confirm the veracity of evidence.
"While some proponents of both have laudable goals–protecting the intellectual property of innovators and building intelligence that can save lives–the dangers posed by each are significant.
Technologists have warned about both at length. Jennifer Granick, for example, described in excellent detail the risk of creating a world in which black boxes make life-and-death decisions that cannot be reliably audited. Apple and others have described the risk of backdoor exploits being obtained and abused by criminals.
""The justices had phones [by 1967], and they knew that they talked about their most private stuff on those phones," says Jennifer Stisa Granick, director of civil liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. "So a case that considered warrantless wiretapping looks a lot different. ... And I think that same exact dynamic is happening here.""