The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School is a leader in the study of the law and policy around the Internet and other emerging technologies.
This Article focuses on one cyberphysical domain — automated driving — to methodically analyze the so-called liability problem. It considers how automated driving could affect product liability, how product liability could affect automated driving, and how each could advance or impede the prevention of injury and the compensation of victims.
Download the paper from SSRN.
This article discusses the resistance to the Digital Revolution and the emergence of a social movement “resisting the resistance.” Mass empowerment has political implications that may provoke reactionary counteractions. Ultimately — as I have discussed elsewhere — resistance to the Digital Revolution can be seen as a response to Baudrillard’s call to a return to prodigality beyond the structural scarcity of the capitalistic market economy.
Forthcoming in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal
In the information society, the role of private sector entities in gathering information for and about users has long been a most critical issue. Therefore, intermediaries have become a main focus of privacy regulations, especially in jurisdictions with a strong tradition of privacy protection such as Europe. In a landmark case, the ECJ ruled that an internet search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it carries out of personal data which appear on web pages published by third parties.
Since the enactment of the first safe harbours and liability exemptions for online intermediaries, market conditions have radically changed. Originally, intermediary liability exemptions were introduced to promote an emerging Internet market. Do safe harbours for online intermediaries still serve innovation? Should they be limited or expanded? These critical questions — often tainted by protectionist concerns — define the present intermediary liability conundrum. Apparently, safe harbours still hold, although secondary liability is on the rise.
For more than forty years, electronic surveillance law in the United States has drawn a strong distinction between the protections afforded to communications "content"and those afforded to the "noncontent"—also known as "metadata"—associated with it. The legal framework for surveillance law was developed largely in the context of the mid-twentieth century telephone system, which itself treated content and metadata as cleanly distinct technical concepts.