Stanford CIS

What are the Legal Issues Surrounding the Use of Depleted Uranium in Syria and Iraq?

By Beth Van Schaack on

Although it received little attention at the time, journalist Samuel Oakford broke the storylast month that the Pentagon has confirmed using weapons containing depleted uranium (DU) in Syria against ISIS targets—an about face from a previously articulated position.  (A-10 gunships are also flying in Iraq, although there has been no reporting so far on DU use there). How significant is this from a law-of-war perspective?  Given the lack of a treaty or customary law rule dedicated to regulating DU weapons, their use is evaluated under the general international humanitarian law (IHL) principles that apply toindiscriminate attacks, weapons that are by nature indiscriminate or that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, and means or methods of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause severe harm to the natural environment.  These concepts are difficult to apply, however, with respect to DU because the science behind its long-term impact on human health and the environment remains indeterminate.

DU is a byproduct of enriching uranium ore for use as fuel in nuclear reactors or (less so today) in nuclear weapons; it is essentially what is left over (the U-238 isotope) from the process of purifying the fissile isotope of uranium (U-235). Given its high density (1.7 times that of lead), DU has both offensive and defensive utilities.  It is used in munitions aimed at piercing armor (including jacketed “penetrators” and landmines), within certain equipment (such as in defensive tank panels or in aircraft counterweights requiring maximum mass in minimum space), and for radiation shielding.  The U.S. Department of Energy manages huge DU stockpiles (generally produced as byproducts of the uranium enrichment process), so additional civilian and military uses are constantly being sought.

Contrary to popular belief, DU is only slightly radioactive; indeed, it is 40 to 60 percentless radioactive than naturally occurring uranium, which itself is only mildly radioactive.  DU is, however, toxic, particularly when inside the body (in the form of fragments or dust,when aerosolized upon impact, or if wounds are contaminated).  In addition to combat exposure, contact can come from friendly fire incidents or during the disposal of damaged equipment.

The Department of Defense claims that no significant health problems have beenassociated with exposure to DU, including in service members who served in the First Gulf War (where DU was widely used) or in animal studies. (The Veterans Administration site devoted to DU exposure is here). Likewise, in a 2001 post-conflict assessment, the United Nations Environmental Programme found no signs of contamination or reports of health effects in NATO peacekeepers who served in Kosovo, where DU projectiles were also used.  These conclusions are not shared by all observers, and complaints about “Gulf War Syndrome” (which encompasses DU poisoning) and horrific birth defects in places like Fallujah, where there was extensive use of DU, continue to surface. DU may also cause environmental damage, particularly if it gets in the food chain.  All told, at this point in time, the science and the medical data seem inconclusive.

The legality of using DU in armed conflict situations is in question, in part because the science is too. There is no treaty dedicated to regulating the production, use, destruction, or stockpiling of DU weapons as there is with respect to other problematic weapons and weapon systems, such as biological or chemical weapons, cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines, and blinding laser weapons. A civil society organization, theInternational Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons, has drafted a notional treaty on DU, based on the same structure as the Cluster Munitions Convention (a draft is here), but it has yet to be subjected to sustained multilateral negotiations.

Read the full post at Just Security.

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