I have admired SAIS professor Francis Fukuyama's quality of thought since I was first exposed to him through his article "The End of History" back in college. Mostly I've cited his work on trust in my writings on Online Dispute Resolution. However, my respect for him reached new heights with his stunning piece in the New York Times magazine on Sunday.
In it Fukuyama, long considered a leading mind in the Neoconservative movement, rejects many of the core tenets of Neoconservative thought that were used to justify the war. He states unequivocally that "Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something I can no longer support."
To have one of the intellectual architects of the theories that undergirded the Iraq war make such clear, unflinching statements is truly breathtaking, especially in this age of feint and spin. What is more surprising to me is that I agree with most of his recommendations as to how we should proceed from here:
"...the legacy of the Bush first-term foreign policy and its neoconservative supporters has been so polarizing that it is going to be hard to have a reasoned debate about how to appropriately balance American ideals and interests in the coming years. The reaction against a flawed policy can be as damaging as the policy itself, and such a reaction is an indulgence we cannot afford, given the critical moment we have arrived at in global politics."
Fukuyama explains further:
"Neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony. What is needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world - ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony to bring these ends about."
In other words, Fukuyama is denying Fish's false "fight or convert" dichotomy, instead arguing for a more balanced, cooperative approach as to how we can move toward a democratic world:
"If we are serious about the good governance agenda, we have to shift our focus to the reform, reorganization and proper financing of those institutions of the United States government that actually promote democracy, development and the rule of law around the world, organizations like the State Department, U.S.A.I.D., the National Endowment for Democracy and the like. The United States has played an often decisive role in helping along many recent democratic transitions, including in the Philippines in 1986; South Korea and Taiwan in 1987; Chile in 1988; Poland and Hungary in 1989; Serbia in 2000; Georgia in 2003; and Ukraine in 2004-5. But the overarching lesson that emerges from these cases is that the United States does not get to decide when and where democracy comes about. By definition, outsiders can't "impose" democracy on a country that doesn't want it; demand for democracy and reform must be domestic. Democracy promotion is therefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await the gradual ripening of political and economic conditions to be effective."
Again, to have such honesty and forthright reversal from someone who played such a prominent role in the march to war is refreshing. And it's not refreshing only to those of us who opposed the war from the beginning. This isn't about an "I told you so" moment -- this is a moment of clarity when a window of opportunity opens offering the promise of a new American consensus. I applaud Fukuyama for his intellectual honesty, and I'll be first in line to buy his book when it comes out next month.