Stanford CIS

Michigan Federal District Court grants preliminary injunction to block enforcement of statute against exposure of violent video

By Stanford Center for Internet and Society on

In an action brought by three video game businesses, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of a portion of Michigan 2005 Public Act 108 (the “Act”), which prohibited “the dissemination, exhibit[ion], or display of certain sexually explicit and ultra-violent explicit video games to minors without the consent of their parents or guardians.”   The Court held that the defendants, officials of the State of Michigan, were unlikely to succeed on the merits and, should the statute be enforced, irreparable harm would follow from the loss of First Amendment freedoms.  In conducting its analysis, the Court applied a four factor test to determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, (2) whether irreparable injury would ensue if the injunction was not granted, (3) whether the injunction would harm others, and (4) whether the injunction was in the public interest.

With regard to the first factor, the Court noted that “video games constitute expression protected by the First Amendment,” and applied strict scrutiny analysis to the Act because it was a content-based restriction of speech.  To meet this standard, the defendants had to show that the Act served a compelling state interest and that it was narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.  To show a compelling state interest, the defendants cited studies purporting to show that violent media had an effect on adolescent aggression.  The Court was unconvinced by this evidence because it failed to single out the effects of violent video games as opposed to other violent media, it did not show the video games actually caused violence, and it was contested by other experts.  The Court also held that the Act was not narrowly tailored to achieve the defendants’ purpose because it was likely to chill adult expression.  Moreover, the threat of criminal penalties and inability to clearly determine what games fell within the scope of the Act meant that game creators, distributors, and retailers would likely self-censor.  Therefore, because the Act was neither necessary to serve a compelling state interest nor narrowly tailored to achieve that end, the court held that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on the merits.

In analyzing second factor, the Court held that any loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even short amounts of time, would constitute irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. With regard to the third and fourth factors, the Court found that these factors also favored plaintiffs for three reasons: (1) the defendants were unable to demonstrate the harm the Act was meant to protect against, (2) the First Amendment issues previously discussed, and (3) enforcing the Act would cause harm to those video game distributors who would be prosecuted under the law.

Because all four factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, the court granted the preliminary injunction.

Published in: Blog , Vol. 3, No. 3 , Packets