Although much of the policy discussion has focused on the problems created by TCG's remote attestation feature, people like Ross Anderson and, to some extent, Seth Schoen have repeatedly argued that the possibility to seal data to particular platform states is problematic as well, because it may complicate updates and other hardware/software changes, thereby locking consumers into particular hardware/software vendors.
In the area of remote attestation, a few months ago, two papers proposed mechanisms for property-based remote attestation that could solve some of the policy-related problems of remote attestation (see here and the IBM research report called "Property Attestation" available in the literature section below).
Now, two authors of the first paper have, in collaboration with three other authors, have published a paper that proposes similar solutions regarding the sealing functionality. Out of the three solutions they propose, the third one is a property-based sealing mechanism that would not seal data to particular has values of binaries, but only to certain security properties. This proposal has its own problems (how to define such security properties; who should operate the "Update Certification Authority" that is required to issue certificates on certain security properties). But it's a really interesting strand of current TC research.