The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the extent to which a federal statute authorizes broad and expansive border searches by U.S. customs officials and whether such searches violate Constitutional protections in the Fourth or First Amendments. In particular, the case focused on the detailed examination at a border crossing, without a warrant, of electronic equipment purporting to contain “expressive material.”The case arose when defendant, crossing into the U.S. from Canada, raised the suspicion of customs agents who then conducted an extensive search of his vehicle. After finding evidence of child pornography in photo albums, they proceeded to examine defendant's computer and several computer disks, which also contained similar illegal material.
Defendant argued that the evidence uncovered by search of his electronic equipment should have been suppressed at trial because such equipment was not specifically listed in the border search statute. The court disagreed and held that 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) – the statute at issue – does permit very broad and extensive searches at border crossings which clearly encompass examination of electronic equipment. The court reached its decision by looking at the language of the statute itself (holding that defendant's computer and disks were not somehow exempt from the ordinary definition of the word “cargo”), the specific context in which the language is used (finding that Congress's repeated use of the word “any” indicates that they intended the statute to be read broadly), and the broader context of the statute as a whole (holding that the traditionally broad construction of the statute, to the very limits compatible with the Constitution, is supported by the national security interests at stake at border crossings).
Defendant further argued that even if permitted by statute, the search of his electronic equipment violated his Constitutional right against unreasonable search (Fourth Amendment) and that the search involved expressive material on his computer, which should be exempt under the First Amendment. The court disagreed and held that border searches without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they are made at the border, where the government's interest in keeping unwanted persons out are the highest. The court further emphasized that such expansive searches have been permitted for as long as the Fourth Amendment has existed. The court also refused to carve out a First Amendment exception to such searches when they involve expressive material. To do so, the court held, would be to allow exceptions for all such “expressive” materials, including, for example, terrorist plans, which would undermine the very reason behind border searches. The court also held that it would be unfeasible to require customs agents, in the scope of their everyday duties, to draw the difficult lines of deciding what constitutes expressive material and whether it can be searched. The court, therefore, found no constitutional defect or exceptions in the border search doctrine.