Defendant James Glazner filed for divorce from the plaintiff, Elisabeth Glazner. During the divorce proceedings, the defendant put a recording device on a telephone in the marital home and recorded conversations between the plaintiff and third parties without their knowledge. Upon discovering this device, the plaintiff sued the defendant for violating the wiretapping provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, U.S.C. § § 2510-22, which prohibits non-consensual recordings of private conversations, with certain exceptions, and authorizes civil remedies. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, citing Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court found an implied interspousal exemption in Title III. On appeal, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, bound to follow Simpson until it was overruled by an en banc decision of the court or by the Supreme Court, affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The court then granted the plaintiff’s motion to rehear the petition en banc.The en banc court found that the plain language of the statute did not provide for an interspousal exemption. The statute provides that “any person” is subject to the wiretapping provisions and makes no distinction between married and unmarried persons. Citing the rule that a court may look beyond the plain language of a statute if adhering strictly to the language of Congress would lead to a truly absurd result, the court found that allowing Title III to govern interspousal behavior would not lead to an absurd result, and, therefore, there was no compelling reason to infer an interspousal exemption. The court also looked to the persuasive authority of other federal circuit and district courts and found that the majority of them have not inferred an interspousal exemption to Title III. Based on these factors, the court overturned the interspousal wiretapping exemption of Simpson.
The court also considered whether this new rule should apply retroactively or prospectively. Applying retrospective application would allow for the compensation of past victims, which would further the purpose of the statute, to protect people from nonconsensual wiretapping. Also, because individuals affected by the new rule would still have been subject to criminal and potential civil liability under state law wiretapping provisions, inequity arising from retrospective application of the new rule would be insufficient to justify prospective-only application. Retrospective application would not create liability where none previously existed. Based on these factors, the court held that the new rule applies retroactively.