The plaintiffs, the Traditional Cat Association and its head Diana L. Finerman, sued the defendants for using the name “Traditional Cat Association.” The case went to trial on the plaintiffs’ claims of copyright infringement and coversion and the defendants’ counterclaims of defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic damage, and conversion. The judge entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on the copyright infringement claims. The defendants voluntarily dismissed their counterclaim for defamation at the close of evidence, and the jury found for the plaintiffs on the defendants claim for conversion. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the plaintiffs’ claim for conversion and the defendants’ claim for defamation, so the judge declared mistrials on those claims.
The defendants then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees based on the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §505. The district court ruled that the defendants were entitled to attorneys’ fees, and required the defendants to submit a detailed accounting of the requested fees. The plaintiffs argued against the defendants’ request for 100% of their attorneys’ fees by claiming that the non-copyright claims were “separate and distinct” from the copyright claim. The plaintiffs also argued against the defendant’s alternative request for 80% of attorneys’ fees by claiming that the defendants did not adequately support their claim that 80% of the fees should be allocated to the copyright claims.
The district court agreed that a 100% recovery was not appropriate because the non-copyright claims were not subject to attorneys’ fees. The court also ruled that the defendants did not adequately support their claim that 80% of the fees should be allocated to the copyright claims. However, rather than give even the 25% recovery that the plaintiffs suggested, the court denied the defendants’ fee request altogether.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions. First, the court ordered the district court to determine which of the claims were copyright-related. The court noted controlling precedent that established that the party entitled to attorneys fees can only recover on the copyright claim or any “related claims,” but not for unrelated claims just because they were part of the same lawsuit.
Second, the court required the lower court to attempt to apportion fees between the copyright and non-copyright claims. The court held that even though it was a complex task, the court cannot properly deny fees because it decides it does not have enough evidence. The district court was required to use whatever knowledge it had, which the Ninth Circuit noted was a substantial amount, to make its best attempt to apportion the fees rather than deny fees altogether.