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DECISIONS

Superior CourtsCourt of Appeal, Civil Action, RecordTV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd, [2011] 1 SLR 830; [2010] SGCA 43, December 1, 2010 [(1) The appellant/plaintiff, RecordTV, was the provider of a remote-store digital video recorder service, known as iDVR or Internet digital video recorder, which allowed its registered users to request the recording of the respondents/defendants' free-to-air broadcasts in Singapore, based on the scheduling information of the respondents' programming which the appellant has provided. The respondents' broadcasts were received by the appellant's roof-mounted antenna and routed to the appellant's recording computers. If a registered user requested a recording, the appellant's control software would instruct the system to record the said program. Once a recording was made and stored on the appellant's premises' computers, it was made available for viewing to the user who requested the recording on their computers or their TVs. At the end of 15 days after the date of recording, the recordings were deleted. (2) In relation to its recording system, the appellant's system underwent three configuration changes. In phase 1, the system eliminated the duplication of copies and made only 1 recording despite multiple registered users' requests for the same program to be recorded. In phase 2, the system would make multiple copies of recordings based on multiple user requests for the same programming, but would switch to a single copy being made if system resources were insufficient. In phase 3, the system was reconfigured so that individual copies of the same programming were made for each requesting registered user. The changes were ostensibly made in response to the judgment of the 2nd Circuit in the Cartoon Network LP v CSC Holdings (the Cablevision case). (For purposes of these proceedings, only the appellant's system in relation to phase 1 and phase 2 were in issue.) (3) The respondents' objected, contending that the use of iDVR infringed its copyright in its MediaCorp programming (broadcasts and films). When the defendant commenced groundless threats of infringement proceedings, the plaintiffs in turn counterclaimed for copyright infringement and sought injunctive relief. (4) The High Court allowed the respondents' claim against the appellant for copyright infringement. The appellant appealed.  (5) The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court. It found that it was the registered users requesting the recording of the shows using the appellant's iDVR service rather than the appellant who copied the respondents' programming.  (6) The court also held that the appellant did not communicate the recorded shows to the public – it was the registered users who requested the recording of a particular show and the registered users who did so did not constitute "the public" for purposes of ss 83 and 84 of the Copyright Act. (7) The court also held that there is no reason why the aggregate of private and individual communications made to each registered user should transform the nature of such communications into "public" communications. Each registered user could only access the particular show he had requested to be recorded, and not the entire library of recorded works made by the appellant.  (8) Finally, the court held that the appellant did not authorize the registered users to do any act comprised in the respondents' copyright in their programming. To determine if there is authorization liability, four authorization liability factors have to be considered and evaluated in their totality in the context of the factual matrix of each case: (a) whether the alleged authorizer had control over the means by which copyright infringement was committed and hence, a power to prevent such infringement, (b) the nature of the relationship (if any) between the alleged authorizer and the actual infringer, (c) whether the alleged authorizer took reasonable steps to prevent or avoid copyright infringement, and (d) whether the alleged authorizer had actual or constructive knowledge of the occurrence of copyright infringement or the likelihood of such infringement occurring. On the facts, (a) while the appellant did have the power to prevent potential infringement of the respondents' copyright in its programming by shutting down its iDVR service altogether, it was not necessary to take this drastic step as it had expressly stated in its terms of use that registered users could only use its service to record those shows which they could otherwise legally view and record, (b) while there was a commercial relationship between the appellant and its users, on the evidence, the appellant did not benefit commercially, although the users benefited socially, and there was nothing wrong if the appellant profited from providing its service, (c) the appellant streamed its recorded shows to the users, rather than allowing its users to download them, thereby preventing illegal distribution, and provided in its terms that the recording was only to be used for personal, private and domestic use and only for those shows which a registered user could otherwise legally view and record, meaning that only those registered users in Singapore who held valid TV licenses could use the appellant's iDVR to record the respondents' shows, and not those out of jurisdiction, and (d) given the precautions taken, in absence of express proof of knowledge, it was not right to attribute knowledge of improper usage to the appellant.  For all these reasons, the court held that the appellant was not liable for authorizing the doing of any act comprised in the respondents' copyright in its programming.  (9) The court did not have to deal with the defenses of safe harbor protection and fair use. High Court, Civil Action, Odex Pte. Ltd. v. Pacific Internet Ltd., [2008] SGHC 35, [2008] 3 SLR 18, March 22, 2001 [(1) Odex was a private company that provided Japanese anime programs to local television stations for broadcasting. It also distributed authorized copies of these programs to retailers for sale to the public. Odex alleged that with Internet piracy and the ease of obtaining DVD-quality movie files for free via P2P software, its sales of anime video titles had begun to drop significantly and that TV stations also bought fewer anime titles as they were allegedly losing viewership to illegal downloaders.  (2) To address this problem, Odex engaged the services of BayTSP.com Incorporated (BayTSP), an American company, to collect and track instances of unauthorized uploading and downloading of copies of Japanese anime video titles. Through BayTSP, Odex discovered that there had been more than 474,000 unique downloads over an 11-month period, based on searches conducted on only 50 out of more than 400 authorized titles. In these circumstances, Odex applied under Order 24 Rule 6(5) of the Singapore Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) for the pre-action discovery of documents from various local Internet service providers, to identify the illegal downloaders, based on 981 selected IP addresses of Internet users who were recorded as having carried out the highest instances of such uploading and downloading via the BitTorrent protocol. The defendant Pacific Internet, a local Internet service provider, resisted that application.  (3) Odex’s application for a discovery order failed before the District Court, which held that Odex did not have the locus standi to make the application, since it was only a sub-licensee for most of the video titles (whose infringement Odex complained of). For one title for which Odex was held to be the exclusive licensee (“Mobile Suit Gundam Seed”), the District Court was of the view that Odex had to show an extremely song prima facie case of wrongdoing before the order sought would be made in its favour. As Odex had failed to establish such a case, its application was dismissed.  (4) Odex appealed.  (5) The High Court rejected Odex’s argument that it had the requisite locus standi to apply for a discovery order, in reliance on the Practice Direction 4 of 2005 (“Applications for discovery or interrogatories against network service providers in relation to specific intellectual property issues”) and the Singapore Copyright (Network Service Provider) Regulations 2005 (S 220/2005). Odex had argued that both the Practice Direction and the Regulations refer to an application made “on behalf of a copyright owner”, and in doing so, sanctioned its application as a licensee. The court observed that the Practice Direction did not have the force of substantive law, and that Regulation 3(2)(b) did not pertain to discovery applications. The court also noted that the Singapore Copyright Act did not have an equivalent provision to 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1), which would enable a copyright owner or “a person authorised to act on the owner’s behalf” to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identifying an alleged infringer.  (6) The court held that an agent of a copyright owner or an exclusive licensee could not apply in the agent’s own name for pre-action discovery in order to identify infringers. While the copyright owners could use the services of an agent to track down infringers, they had to use their own names to commence civil court proceedings, apply for pre-action discovery and take formal action for substantive relief. Even if Odex were not relying on Order 24 Rule 6(1) for a discovery order but on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to issue a Norwich Pharmacal discovery order, it still had no locus standi to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Nor could Odex merely claim that it would only use the information to initiate criminal proceedings because as a mere agent, it could not claim to be the right party entitled to relief.  (7) The court reversed the District Court on the requirement for an extremely strong prima facie case of wrongdoing, holding that the court below had prescribed too high a standard of proof. Where there was evidence of wrongdoing, the court would consider the strength of the case by the applicant for discovery order as one of the factors to be considered in the totality of the facts before deciding whether to grant the order in the interest of justice. (8) Nonetheless, the court concluded that it was inexpedient to have the copyright owners start the discovery application all over, especially where on the current appeal, there was an application by some copyright owners to be added as plaintiffs. The court allowed these owners to be added as plaintiffs and allowed disclosure of the subscribers’ information to these plaintiffs as copyright owners for their respective video titles.]

CONTRIBUTORSDaniel SengAssociate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Law, Singapore and SJD Candidate at Stanford Law SchoolEmail: danseng at stanford.edu


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