Riana Pfefferkorn is the Cryptography Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Her work, made possible through funding from the Stanford Cyber Initiative, focuses on investigating and analyzing the U.S. government's policy and practices for forcing decryption and/or influencing crypto-related design of online platforms and services, devices, and products, both via technical means and through the courts and legislatures. Riana also researches the benefits and detriments of strong encryption on free expression, political engagement, economic development, and other public interests.
Prior to joining Stanford, Riana was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she worked on litigation and counseling matters involving online privacy, Internet intermediary liability, consumer protection, copyright, trademark, and trade secrets and was actively involved in the firm's pro bono program. Before that, Riana clerked for the Honorable Bruce J. McGiverin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She also interned during law school for the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Riana earned her law degree from the University of Washington School of Law and her undergraduate degree from Whitman College.
High Res Photo of Riana Pfefferkorn
In September 2016, we filed a Petition in the Northern District of California (the federal district court for the Bay Area and much of Northern California) asking the court to unseal years’ worth of surveillance matters filed there. We had our first hearing before the court on May 4.
Researchers at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society (CIS) filed a petition yesterday seeking to unseal judicial records in San Francisco federal district court. Their goal is to reveal how the federal government uses U.S. law to obligate smartphone manufacturers and Internet companies to decrypt private user data, turn over encryption keys, or otherwise assist law enforcement with digital surveillance.
Yesterday, the Center for Internet and Society filed a new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to uncover the U.S. government’s legal strategies for defeating encryption in law enforcement investigations.
Arguing that if the court should not compel Apple to create software to enable unlocking and search of the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, it will jeopardize digital and personal security more generally.
Apple recently confirmed the introduction of a new feature called “USB Restricted Mode” in the latest version of the iPhone’s mobile operating system, iOS 12. If enabled in the user’s settings, USB Restricted Mode will disable data transfer from the iPhone over the Lightning cable once the phone has been locked for an hour unless the phone’s password is entered.
Included in this PDF are:
- Petitioners' Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to file Motion for Reconsideration
- Exhibit A Petitioners' [Proposed] Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration of the May 1, 2018 Order
- Declaration of Jennifer Stisa Granick in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration
- [Proposed] Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Local Rule 7-9.
Which would you prefer: keeping your valuables in a locked safe, or keeping them in a shoebox and trusting that everyone will adhere to laws against theft and their concomitant penalties? Most, if not all, of us will choose the former. That’s so even if we realize that safe-crackers may ultimately find a way someday to bust open even the most top-of-the-line safe currently on offer.
Abstract. Federal law enforcement officials in the United States have recently renewed their periodic demands for legislation to regulate encryption. While they offer few technical specifics, their general proposal—that vendors must retain the ability to decrypt for law enforcement the devices they manufacture or communications their services transmit—presents intractable problems that would-be regulators must not ignore.
"Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, said FlexiSPY is “kind of an app version of a wire.” Wiretaps are the traditional monitoring tool used by law enforcement after obtaining a warrant signed by a judge.
“It can be done quickly, but it’s not something that can be done remotely,” Pfefferkorn said. “That raises the question for me of whether this was a U.S. law enforcement agency that installed this on Chapo’s phone, if it was his phone.”"
"On Friday, Riana Pfefferkorn, cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, explored in an article for national security blog Just Security what this approach with exigent circumstances may look like.
""Third-party tools such as Cellebrite and GrayKey, combined with other sources of data such as cloud backups, metadata, the Internet of Things, and so-called 'lawful hacking,' mean law enforcement still has a wealth of information available to it for investigations and prosecutions," said Riana Pfefferkorn, cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society."
"Encryption is the best tool people have for defending against hackers, cybercriminals and government surveillance, said Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Still, “your communications encryption choices are only worth as much as the trustworthiness of the people you're talking to,” she said.
"akeaway: Public data, of course, is already public. But now providers have an obligation to package it up and ship it over to defense counsel, notes Riana Pfefferkorn of Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society. “Providers are now on notice that they’re presumably going to get a lot more of these types of subpoenas.”"
Widespread availability of advanced encryption technology has improved security for consumers and businesses. But as digital products and services have become more secure, some in the law enforcement and intelligence communities have voiced concerns that encryption inhibits their ability to prevent terrorism and prosecute crimes. For example, the Department of Justice is exploring a potential legal mandate requiring companies to design their technologies to allow law enforcement to access consumer data during criminal investigations.
When you give sites and services information about yourself, where does it go? Who else will get hold of it, and what will they use it for? The recent revelations about Cambridge Analytica's acquisition of data about tens of millions of Facebook users without their knowledge or consent have prompted renewed interest in how data about us gets shared, sold, used, and misused -- well beyond what we ever expected. Join us for a SLATA/CIS lunchtime conversation with three experts from Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society as we discuss the legal and policy implications of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and responses from Congress and courts. How can we prevent this from happening again? What new problems might we create through poorly-crafted legal responses?
CIS Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn will be speaking on a panel on "Cryptography and Ethics"at the 2018 Cybersecurity Law Symposium. Leading experts from academia and industry will discuss the legal and policy issues that arise from the latest developments in cybersecurity. This event is open to the public, but registration is required.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn will be speaking at the 2018 InfoSec Southwest.
Encryption shields private information from malicious eavesdroppers. After years of slow adoption, encryption is finally becoming widespread in consumer-oriented electronic devices and communications services. Consumer-oriented encryption software is now more user-friendly, and much of it turns on encryption by default. These advances enhance privacy and security for millions of people.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn was a guest on the WashingTech Policy Podcast with Joseph Miller.
"While the battle against encryption has been going on within federal law enforcement circles (dubbed "going dark") since at least the early 1990s, Rosenstein has now called for "responsible encryption."