Riana Pfefferkorn is the Cryptography Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Her work, made possible through funding from the Stanford Cyber Initiative, focuses on investigating and analyzing the U.S. government's policy and practices for forcing decryption and/or influencing crypto-related design of online platforms and services, devices, and products, both via technical means and through the courts and legislatures. Riana also researches the benefits and detriments of strong encryption on free expression, political engagement, economic development, and other public interests.
Prior to joining Stanford, Riana was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she worked on litigation and counseling matters involving online privacy, Internet intermediary liability, consumer protection, copyright, trademark, and trade secrets and was actively involved in the firm's pro bono program. Before that, Riana clerked for the Honorable Bruce J. McGiverin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She also interned during law school for the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Riana earned her law degree from the University of Washington School of Law and her undergraduate degree from Whitman College.
High Res Photo of Riana Pfefferkorn
In the upcoming version of the Apple iPhone iOS operating system, iOS 12, the phone’s Lightning cable port (used for charging and data transmission) will be disabled an hour after the phone is locked. The device will still charge, but transferring data to or from the device via the Lightning cable will require entering the device’s password first.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.
- Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"
Arguing that if the court should not compel Apple to create software to enable unlocking and search of the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, it will jeopardize digital and personal security more generally.
Apple recently confirmed the introduction of a new feature called “USB Restricted Mode” in the latest version of the iPhone’s mobile operating system, iOS 12. If enabled in the user’s settings, USB Restricted Mode will disable data transfer from the iPhone over the Lightning cable once the phone has been locked for an hour unless the phone’s password is entered.
Included in this PDF are:
- Petitioners' Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to file Motion for Reconsideration
- Exhibit A Petitioners' [Proposed] Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration of the May 1, 2018 Order
- Declaration of Jennifer Stisa Granick in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration
- [Proposed] Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Local Rule 7-9.
Which would you prefer: keeping your valuables in a locked safe, or keeping them in a shoebox and trusting that everyone will adhere to laws against theft and their concomitant penalties? Most, if not all, of us will choose the former. That’s so even if we realize that safe-crackers may ultimately find a way someday to bust open even the most top-of-the-line safe currently on offer.
Abstract. Federal law enforcement officials in the United States have recently renewed their periodic demands for legislation to regulate encryption. While they offer few technical specifics, their general proposal—that vendors must retain the ability to decrypt for law enforcement the devices they manufacture or communications their services transmit—presents intractable problems that would-be regulators must not ignore.
"Even if authorized by a warrant, the dissemination of vulnerable devices could create a risk of significant harm. Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, told Human Rights Watch it would be “frightening to use a wiretap order to authorize seeding compromised devices among people.” She suggested that anyone who might accept such a tactic when the targets are suspected drug traffickers should consider a hypothetical scenario in which agents secretly gave such non-secure devices to “journalists or activists.”"
"Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, said FlexiSPY is “kind of an app version of a wire.” Wiretaps are the traditional monitoring tool used by law enforcement after obtaining a warrant signed by a judge.
“It can be done quickly, but it’s not something that can be done remotely,” Pfefferkorn said. “That raises the question for me of whether this was a U.S. law enforcement agency that installed this on Chapo’s phone, if it was his phone.”"
"“There's nothing preventing an Apple employee from doing the exact same thing in a world where there's mandatory key escrow for exceptional access to smartphones,” said Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. “Once the deed is done by an insider, then what was supposed to be a tool only for the ‘good guys’ is out there for the ‘bad guys’ as well.”"
"On Friday, Riana Pfefferkorn, cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, explored in an article for national security blog Just Security what this approach with exigent circumstances may look like.
""Third-party tools such as Cellebrite and GrayKey, combined with other sources of data such as cloud backups, metadata, the Internet of Things, and so-called 'lawful hacking,' mean law enforcement still has a wealth of information available to it for investigations and prosecutions," said Riana Pfefferkorn, cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society."
Registration is required for this free event.
With the DOJ recently bringing back the "Going Dark" debate, and now calling for "responsible encryption," what does the Trump administration have to say about strong crypto? Do we know yet? Do they?
If there's anyone who might be able to figure that out, it's Riana Pfefferkorn.
The EastWest Institute’s Global Cooperation in Cyberspace program anticipates future security risks, defines the outlines of potential conflict and brings together the people who can do something about it.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn was a guest on the WashingTech Policy Podcast with Joseph Miller.
"While the battle against encryption has been going on within federal law enforcement circles (dubbed "going dark") since at least the early 1990s, Rosenstein has now called for "responsible encryption."