High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
Reply brief of Movants-Appellants EFF, ACLU, and Riana Pfefferkorn to the Ninth Circuit in our appeal from the district court's denial of our motion to unseal filings in a sealed case wherein the Department of Justice allegedly sought to compel Facebook to comply with a wiretap order for Facebook's end-to-end encrypted voice calling app, Messenger.
Opening brief of Movants-Appellants EFF, ACLU, and Riana Pfefferkorn to the Ninth Circuit in our appeal from the district court's denial of our motion to unseal filings in a sealed case wherein the Department of Justice allegedly sought to compel Facebook to comply with a wiretap order for Facebook's end-to-end encrypted voice calling app, Messenger.
Brief of amici curiae ACLU, ACLU of Georgia, and Riana Pfefferkorn in support of appellant Victor Mobley in Mobley v. State, a Georgia Supreme Court case presenting the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the seizure of digital data stored by a vehicle -- specifically, a car's event data recorder (EDR).
Reply brief in support of January 2019 objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
A hacking collective on Monday released what it claims are more than one million unique device numbers for Apple products that it allegedly pulled from an FBI agent’s laptop.
To cap off a summer of devastating corporate data breaches, hackers yesterday posted online what might be the crown jewel of 2012 data dumps: 1 million identification numbers for Apple iPhones, iPads and iPod Touch's, all purportedly stolen from the FBI.
If Twitter were to turn over the user's identity at the first request, it could be liable for any mistake or potential invasion of privacy, according to Jennifer Granick, the director of civil liberties for Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society.
Eight years ago, Barack Obama arrived in Washington pledging to reverse the dramatic expansion of state surveillance his predecessor had presided over in the name of fighting terrorism. Instead, the Obama administration saw the Bush era’s “collect it all” approach to surveillance become still more firmly entrenched. Meanwhile, the advanced spying technologies once limited to intelligence agencies have been gradually trickling down to local police departments.
Join Mozilla and Stanford CIS for the second installment in a series of conversations about government hacking. Information from our first event, discussing the upcoming changes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, are available at that event’s page here.
On December 1, 2016, significant and controversial changes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 are scheduled go into effect. Today, Rule 41 prohibits a federal judge from issuing a search warrant outside of the judge’s district, with some exceptions.Traditionally, federal judges may only issue warrants that will be executed within their own districts. The revised Rule 41 would permit judges to issue search and seizure warrants for computers outside their jurisdictions, in two circumstances: if the computer’s true location has been hidden through technological means (such as Tor), or, in a computer-hacking investigation under the CFAA, if the affected computers are located in five or more districts.
Stanford CIS brings together scholars, academics, legislators, students, programmers, security researchers, and scientists to study the interaction of new technologies and the law and to examine how the synergy between the two can either promote or harm public goods like free speech, innovation, privacy, public commons, diversity, and scientific inquiry. Come hear CIS Directors Jennifer Granick + Daphne Keller and Resident Fellows Riana Pfefferkorn + Luiz Fernando Marrey Moncau talk about our work, and the assistance CIS provides to students in learning about these issues, selecting courses, identifying job opportunities, and making professional connections.
US intelligence agencies - the eponymous American spies - are exceedingly aggressive, pushing and sometimes bursting through the technological, legal and political boundaries of lawful surveillance. Written for a general audience by a surveillance law expert, this book educates readers about how the reality of modern surveillance differs from popular understanding. Weaving the history of American surveillance - from J.
It’s nearly impossible to know if you're having a truly private, unmonitored conversation today. Big data and online communications open the door for widespread surveillance. But even if you feel like you personally have nothing to hide, surveillance is about much more than individual privacy – it’s about the necessary conditions of a free and just society, and protecting a space to criticize the status quo and the powers that be.