High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
The Internet is under threat, mostly from governments. We need companies to help people stand up to government threats, but companies cannot solve the problems for us. This is what I told the audience on Thursday, at an event co-hosted by CIS and the Program on Liberation Technology.
Tomorrow, all five members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) will testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee about their recent report concluding that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of phone records under section 215 is illegal and ill-advised. Meanwhile, the PCLOB is gearing up to report in a few months its conclusions regarding mass surveillance of the content of Internet transactions under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
Today, Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society joins Greenpeace, Mozilla, Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Libertarian Party, and an array of ideologically diverse groups in The Day We Fight Back against mass surveillance.
Yesterday, I wrote generally about the problems with section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). Today I focus on categories of information—including content—that NSA collects under section 702 but maybe never minimizes—meaning one of the few safeguards for U.S. person privacy is non-existent. In short, since the thirteen-page 702 minimization procedures only apply to communications, and since today's NSA probably excludes unshared cloud-stored data from the definition of communications, it's possible no minimization rules apply to protect American privacy.
I've written a lot about the problems with the FISA Amendments Act and section 702, which is the legal basis for the PRISM surveillance program and involves warrantless collection of communications contents via targeting non-U.S. individuals or entities reasonably believed to be located abroad.
Reply brief of Movants-Appellants EFF, ACLU, and Riana Pfefferkorn to the Ninth Circuit in our appeal from the district court's denial of our motion to unseal filings in a sealed case wherein the Department of Justice allegedly sought to compel Facebook to comply with a wiretap order for Facebook's end-to-end encrypted voice calling app, Messenger.
Opening brief of Movants-Appellants EFF, ACLU, and Riana Pfefferkorn to the Ninth Circuit in our appeal from the district court's denial of our motion to unseal filings in a sealed case wherein the Department of Justice allegedly sought to compel Facebook to comply with a wiretap order for Facebook's end-to-end encrypted voice calling app, Messenger.
Brief of amici curiae ACLU, ACLU of Georgia, and Riana Pfefferkorn in support of appellant Victor Mobley in Mobley v. State, a Georgia Supreme Court case presenting the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the seizure of digital data stored by a vehicle -- specifically, a car's event data recorder (EDR).
Reply brief in support of January 2019 objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
"Stanford Law School’s Professor Jennifer Granick disagrees, and she chastises Professor Kerr for lumping Aaron’s alleged conduct of “circumventing code-based restrictions” in with the crime of ”using someone else’s password, which is the quintessential access without authorization” proscribed by the CFAA because, as Professor Granick explained, “[u]sing another person’s password gets you access to their files."
"But lost in the praise is the fact that such an amendment wouldn’t necessarily, as Jennifer Granick of the Center for Internet Law and Society observed days ago, have kept Aaron Swartz from being prosecuted."
As Jennifer Granick, director of civil liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, recently wrote: "'Authorization' gives great power to the computer system owner. That entity may unilaterally decide what is right and wrong on their system, and the [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] brings the full force of federal law behind it. Yet outside of the computer context, crimes punish social wrongs, not merely offenses to personal or business preferences."
"The level of precision that satisfies advertisers is very different from the amount of exactitude federal authorities need, said Jennifer Granick, director of civil liberties for Stanford University’s Center for Internet and Society."
For more information visit: http://law.scu.edu/hightech/2013-internet-law-wip.cfm