High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
The Internet is under threat, mostly from governments. We need companies to help people stand up to government threats, but companies cannot solve the problems for us. This is what I told the audience on Thursday, at an event co-hosted by CIS and the Program on Liberation Technology.
Tomorrow, all five members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) will testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee about their recent report concluding that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of phone records under section 215 is illegal and ill-advised. Meanwhile, the PCLOB is gearing up to report in a few months its conclusions regarding mass surveillance of the content of Internet transactions under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
Today, Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society joins Greenpeace, Mozilla, Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Libertarian Party, and an array of ideologically diverse groups in The Day We Fight Back against mass surveillance.
Yesterday, I wrote generally about the problems with section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). Today I focus on categories of information—including content—that NSA collects under section 702 but maybe never minimizes—meaning one of the few safeguards for U.S. person privacy is non-existent. In short, since the thirteen-page 702 minimization procedures only apply to communications, and since today's NSA probably excludes unshared cloud-stored data from the definition of communications, it's possible no minimization rules apply to protect American privacy.
I've written a lot about the problems with the FISA Amendments Act and section 702, which is the legal basis for the PRISM surveillance program and involves warrantless collection of communications contents via targeting non-U.S. individuals or entities reasonably believed to be located abroad.
Reply brief in support of January 2019 objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
"In a session at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, Stanford Center for Internet and Society director of Civil Liberties Jennifer Granick and Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn, acknowledged that there is more information about us than ever before, with sensors both on and offline. All encryption is doing, they said, is removing a fraction of law enforcement.
"Touching on cases like the Snowden or the Lavabit incidents, the duo strongly emphasized that companies should start asking themselves a couple of questions before law enforcement actually comes knocking at their door. Knowing what they collect, how they store it, for how long, why, what can it access, does it encrypt data and where are keys stored – are only a few of them.
"3. How to push back against law enforcement requests
"“How can we tell if the court process is legitimate if so much of it is under seal?” asked Jennifer Granick, director of civil liberties at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society."
"“The lawsuit is asking for two things,” said Jennifer Granick, the director of civil liberties at Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society.
“That people be notified eventually, if they are spied on, and, two, it’s asking for a much more scrupulous and discriminating use of gag orders, which are now seemingly routine when they are supposed to be extraordinary.”"
The American Bar Association White Collar Crime Committee Presents:
Only LLM and SPILS students are invited.
Lunch will be provided.
Come meet CIS and hear about our exciting work and ways to get involved.
You will meet:
Jennifer Granick - Director - Civil Liberties
Aleecia McDonald - Director - Privacy