High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
Yesterday's report from the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, or PCLOB, confirms what Christopher Sprigman and I said back in June of last year in our New York Times Op Ed “The Criminal NSA”. The NSA’s telephone record metadata program, in which it collects the calling records of almost everyone inside the United States, is illegal. Amend that: it’s screamingly illegal. Flat out.
When should courts follow legal precedent and when should the law change? This is a debate that underlies this month’s contrary decisions about the constitutionality of government collection of telephone call metadata under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. And despite this week’s dual holdings in favor of the government—on this issue and on the issue of laptop border searches—a judicial consensus may be emerging that the Fourth Amendment must evolve along with technology and government surveillance capabilities.
Yesterday, I wrote that the report from the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies--"Liberty And Security In A Changing World”—suggests reforms that would improve U.S. surveillance law’s protection of the rights of foreigners. My non US-person friends seem underwhelmed, so I thought I’d take a moment to elaborate on the changes I’m talking about. Read More.
Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to deny the Petition, plus supporting documents (supporting declaration of Jennifer Granick, administrative motion, proposed orders).
Last week, the Justice Department filed criminal charges against a North Korean operative for a malware attack that endangered hospital systems and crippled the computers of businesses, governments, and individuals around the world. Americans might be surprised to learn that the software used for this 2017 attack — known as “WannaCry” — was based on a hacking tool created by the U.S. government itself.
Included in this PDF are:
- Petitioners' Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to file Motion for Reconsideration
- Exhibit A Petitioners' [Proposed] Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration of the May 1, 2018 Order
- Declaration of Jennifer Stisa Granick in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration
- [Proposed] Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Local Rule 7-9.
For decades, U.S. policies on international data sharing have balanced privacy, principles of comity (respect for the jurisdiction of other countries), and respect for Congress’ power to regulate foreign affairs. Foreign countries seeking data held by U.S. companies generally must follow a process laid out in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or MLATs, which are agreements between governments that facilitate cooperation in investigations. Increasingly, however, countries have complained that the MLAT process in the U.S. is slow and that it allows the U.S.
"The allegation that his recording of the incident violated HIPAA, or the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, is nonsense, said Jennifer Granick, a specialist on privacy issues at Stanford University Law School."
"Law enforcement and civil parties could also get a public email provider to turn over messages with less than a warrant if the email isn't considered "in electronic storage." But what exactly that means has varied between courts, Granick said."
"There's nothing special about a user retweeting," Granick said.
Notorious hacker "Weev" joins Hufftington Post after being found guilty on charges of breaching AT&T's security. Is his conviction a blow to free speech? Or simple justice?
""If somebody mistakenly puts information out there on the web and somebody mistakenly gets that information, that's not illegal," says Jennifer Granick, a lawyer and the director of the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford."
Eight years ago, Barack Obama arrived in Washington pledging to reverse the dramatic expansion of state surveillance his predecessor had presided over in the name of fighting terrorism. Instead, the Obama administration saw the Bush era’s “collect it all” approach to surveillance become still more firmly entrenched. Meanwhile, the advanced spying technologies once limited to intelligence agencies have been gradually trickling down to local police departments.
Join Mozilla and Stanford CIS for the second installment in a series of conversations about government hacking. Information from our first event, discussing the upcoming changes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, are available at that event’s page here.
On December 1, 2016, significant and controversial changes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 are scheduled go into effect. Today, Rule 41 prohibits a federal judge from issuing a search warrant outside of the judge’s district, with some exceptions.Traditionally, federal judges may only issue warrants that will be executed within their own districts. The revised Rule 41 would permit judges to issue search and seizure warrants for computers outside their jurisdictions, in two circumstances: if the computer’s true location has been hidden through technological means (such as Tor), or, in a computer-hacking investigation under the CFAA, if the affected computers are located in five or more districts.
Stanford CIS brings together scholars, academics, legislators, students, programmers, security researchers, and scientists to study the interaction of new technologies and the law and to examine how the synergy between the two can either promote or harm public goods like free speech, innovation, privacy, public commons, diversity, and scientific inquiry. Come hear CIS Directors Jennifer Granick + Daphne Keller and Resident Fellows Riana Pfefferkorn + Luiz Fernando Marrey Moncau talk about our work, and the assistance CIS provides to students in learning about these issues, selecting courses, identifying job opportunities, and making professional connections.