High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
Over at Just Security, I have a post about the latest iteration of the USA Freedom Act. Basically, civil liberties groups are withdrawing support for the bill because it no longer clearly ends bulk collection of metadata and other information under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the NSL statutes, and the intelligence pen/trap statute as the bill was supposed to do. I explain the language changes that gutted the bill, and lament the state of Congress. Read more here.
Yesterday I attended a conference at the Hoover Institution on “Intelligence Challenges.” I also spoke on a panel in the morning about Civil Liberties. A version of my prepared remarks is below. Ben Wittes has an interesting post on the event.
Over at Just Security I have an analysis of the USA Freedom Act as changed by a recent Manager's Amendment. Basically, I conclude that the Manager's Amendment fails to prohibit "back door searches" for US person information caught up in the NSA dragnet, which was supposedly one of the mail goals of the original bill.
Yesterday afternoon, the White House put out a statement describing its view of vulnerability disclosure: the contentious issue of whether and when government agencies should disclose their knowledge of computer vulnerabilities. Over at Just Security, I highlight some parts of the announcement for further thought.
On Friday, Congress will vote on a mutated version of security threat sharing legislation that had previously passed through the House and Senate. These earlier versions would have permitted private companies to share with the federal government categories of data related to computer security threat signatures. Companies that did so would also receive legal immunity from liability under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and other privacy laws.
Here’s the latest in the encryption case we’ve been writing about in which the Justice Department is asking Magistrate Judge James Orenstein to order Apple to unlock a criminal defendant’s passcode-protected iPhone. The government seized and has authority to search the phone pursuant to a search warrant.
Pending before federal magistrate judge James Orenstein is the government’s request for an order obligating Apple, Inc. to unlock an iPhone and thereby assist prosecutors in decrypting data the government has seized and is authorized to search pursuant to a warrant.
Last week, we wrote about an order from a federal magistrate judge in New York that questioned the government’s ability, under an ancient federal law called the All Writs Act, to compel Apple to decrypt a locked device which the government had seized and is authorized to search pursuant to a warrant.
"“There’s always been employees who have misused the keys,” said ACLU surveillance and cybersecurity counsel Jennifer Granick. She pointed to the tension among some who would prefer that tech platforms censor users' content, whether that’s policing Russian-planted accounts and ads or kicking Trump off Twitter for what they perceive as hate speech. “They’re under extreme pressure from Congress,” she said."
"“Congress has subpoena power, of course,” says Al Gidari, the director of privacy at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, who previously represented several big tech companies in national security cases.
"Albert Gidari, Director of Privacy for the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, told us he agrees with the EFF’s argument:
Asking for metadata on everyone that visits a particular website implicates more than just the particularity required by the 4th Amendment. It implicates the 1st Amendment rights of anyone that visited the site.
"It can be tempting to try to hide information or use technological tricks such as 'duress passwords' that, if used instead of the genuine one, unlock the device but keep a portion of the data hidden and encrypted. But Jennifer Granick, who studies cybersecurity law at Stanford University in California, warns against such strategies. “You don't want to lie to a government agent. That can be a crime.” And border guards are not likely to be sympathetic to the argument that a researcher has a legal duty to prevent anyone from seeing confidential data.
"Jennifer Stisa Granick is an attorney, educator and the director of civil liberties for the Center for Internet and Society (CIS) at Stanford Law School. A prominent advocate for intellectual property law, free speech and privacy, she has represented a number of high-profile hackers, including internet activist Aaron Swartz.
The American Bar Association White Collar Crime Committee Presents:
The Internet’s Own Boy: A Discussion Of U.S. v. Aaron Swartz And The Prosecution And Defense Of Cyber-Crime
Featuring Brian KNAPPENBERGER, Filmmaker And Director Of The Internet’s Own Boy, Jennifer GRANICK, Director Of Civil Liberties For The Center For Internet And Society At Stanford Law School, And More.
Only LLM and SPILS students are invited.
Lunch will be provided.
Please join Giancarlo Frosio and Jennifer Granick on Tuesday for a presentation on the activities of the Stanford Intermediary Liability Lab (SILLab).
Because of Edward Snowden’s remarkable public service, we know that the National Security Agency, with the cooperation of some large firms, has amassed an unprecedented database of personal information. The ostensible goal in collecting that information is to protect national security. The effect, according to Reed Hundt, is to undermine democracy.
Come meet CIS and hear about our exciting work and ways to get involved.
You will meet:
Barbara van Schewick - Associate Professor of Law and Helen L. Crocker Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School, Director of Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, and Associate Professor (by courtesy) of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University
Jennifer Granick - Director - Civil Liberties
Aleecia McDonald - Director - Privacy