High Res Photo of Jennifer Granick
Photo credit: Michael Sugrue
Chris Sprigman and I have a new piece up at The Daily Beast about NSA illegal mass surveillance. This time we're looking at the role of the secret FISA Court, which is what the Administration always points to when it tries to assure Americans that there are no dangers from the emerging NSA Panopticon.
Today the Mozilla Foundation joined an illustrious group of computer scientists and privacy researchers in an amicus brief the Center for Internet and Society filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Jonathan Mayer and I wrote the brief, arguing that weev's conviction in U.S. v.
We at the Center for Internet and Society are writing an amicus brief on Weev's behalf. Signatories must join by JULY 5th. Email me if you want to be a signatory on the brief. My email is jennifer at law dot stanford dot edu.
That brief will argue as follows:
This morning, the NY Times posted my op-ed, co-authored with CIS affiliate scholar Chris Sprigman, arguing that the two federal statutes the Obama Administration has pointed to as authorizing NSA mass surveillance of our phone calls, emails, chats, social networking, etc. -- the FISA Amendments Act and the Patriot Act -- don't actually authorize the NSA's conduct.
Reply brief in support of January 2019 objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
"“There’s always been employees who have misused the keys,” said ACLU surveillance and cybersecurity counsel Jennifer Granick. She pointed to the tension among some who would prefer that tech platforms censor users' content, whether that’s policing Russian-planted accounts and ads or kicking Trump off Twitter for what they perceive as hate speech. “They’re under extreme pressure from Congress,” she said."
"“Congress has subpoena power, of course,” says Al Gidari, the director of privacy at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, who previously represented several big tech companies in national security cases.
"Albert Gidari, Director of Privacy for the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, told us he agrees with the EFF’s argument:
Asking for metadata on everyone that visits a particular website implicates more than just the particularity required by the 4th Amendment. It implicates the 1st Amendment rights of anyone that visited the site.
"It can be tempting to try to hide information or use technological tricks such as 'duress passwords' that, if used instead of the genuine one, unlock the device but keep a portion of the data hidden and encrypted. But Jennifer Granick, who studies cybersecurity law at Stanford University in California, warns against such strategies. “You don't want to lie to a government agent. That can be a crime.” And border guards are not likely to be sympathetic to the argument that a researcher has a legal duty to prevent anyone from seeing confidential data.
"Jennifer Stisa Granick is an attorney, educator and the director of civil liberties for the Center for Internet and Society (CIS) at Stanford Law School. A prominent advocate for intellectual property law, free speech and privacy, she has represented a number of high-profile hackers, including internet activist Aaron Swartz.
To celebrate the one-year anniversary of the Stanford Cryptography Policy Project, we are holding an afternoon event highlighting our research and accomplishments over the past year. As our keynote speakers, it is our pleasure to welcome the Honorable Stephen W. Smith, Magistrate Judge of the Southern District of Texas, and Paul S. Grewal, former Magistrate Judge of the Northern District of California.
What kind of surveillance assistance can the U.S. government force companies to provide? This issue has entered the public consciousness due to the FBI's demand in February that Apple write software to help it access the San Bernardino shooter's encrypted iPhone. Technical assistance orders can go beyond the usual government requests for user data, requiring a company to actively participate in the government's monitoring of the targeted user(s).
On Wednesday, February 17, The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford, The Center for International Governance Innovation, and the Research Advisory Network of the Global Commission on Internet Governance will present an all-day conference entitled "New Alliances in Cybersecurity, Human Rights and Internet Governance." The conference will discuss the challenges of creating a regime of internet governance that pays attention to security and human rights in the digital context.
Over the course of two days in February 2016, the Strauss Center at the University of Texas-Austin will host a unique and timely conference focused on the legal and policy dimensions of cybersecurity.