Albert Gidari is the Director of Privacy at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. He was a partner for over 20 years at Perkins Coie LLP, achieving a top-ranking in privacy law by Chambers. He negotiated the first-ever "privacy by design" consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission on behalf of Google, which required the establishment of a comprehensive privacy program including third party compliance audits. Mr. Gidari is a recognized expert on electronic surveillance law; and, long an advocate for greater transparency in government demands for user data, he brought the first public lawsuit before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, seeking the right of providers to disclose the volume of national security demands received. Mr. Gidari earned an LLM from University of Washington School of Law, his law degree from George Mason University School of Law, and his undergraduate degree from Tulane University.
Hi Res Photo of Albert Gidari
The FBI demand for access to a locked iPhone by compelling Apple to write new software to undo its security features has sucked the oxygen out of the surveillance-privacy debate over the last few weeks. So much is this the case that coverage of the markup of H.R. 699, the Email Privacy Act, tentatively scheduled for March 22, seems sure to be lost in the oral argument on Apple’s case, which is scheduled to be heard the same day. But the Email Privacy Act is incredibly important and it deserves attention.
The Department of Justice (DoJ) filed its response yesterday to Apple's motion to vacate the court’s order that directed Apple to write new code and certify it to circumvent a security feature configured to prevent access to a device. Reaction to the tone and DoJ analysis was swift, and it highlights the stakes of the case for both sides.
The Director of the FBI has made an emotional appeal to get support to compel Apple to crack its own security to provide access to the locked phone it seized from the deceased San Bernadino terrorist.
The government filed a brief today to compel Apple to circumvent its standard security features on the iPhone the government recovered from San Bernadino terrorist Syed Farook. The government argued that the All Writs Act (AWA) authorized the court to require Apple to provide such technical assistance because the AWA has not been limited by Congress and “there is no statute that specifically addresses the issue of Apple’s assistance.” Motion, p. 22. The government questioned Apple's motives for refusing to cooperate and stated that it was not burdensome for Apple to do even if it had to write some software to do comply.
"This is why conversations regarding smart city data collection sometimes miss the point. Albert Gidari, Director of Privacy at the Stanford Centre for Internet and Society, believes focusing on personally identifiable information (PII) is myopic – particularly when there is so much valuable data that can be mined from citizens before you’ve asked for their identity directly.
"Technology lawyer Albert Gidari, director of privacy at the Stanford University Center for Internet and Society, said that in turning over the ads, companies were entering complex legal territory. Ads have long been considered private data on par with email content and other records that the government must have a search warrant to obtain, he said.
""Banning any particular person, group or country is just bad policy - in other parts of the world, platforms will come to be viewed as a tool of U.S. or other foreign policy and it will give authoritarian regimes more excuses to ban speech," Albert Gidari, who as a lawyer has represented tech companies, said in an email. Gidari is now privacy director at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society."
"Albert Gidari, director of privacy for Stanford University Law School’s Center for Internet and Society in California, thoroughly disagrees with his colleagues on the east coast. He told Quartz (in an email, of course) that the Massachusetts decision was “nonsense” and that this question didn’t even really need resolving.
"What measures can authorities undertake in order to avoid cases like the recent Equifax leaks? Should credit bureaus be tested for security breaches by authorities on a regular basis? If so, would the CFPB play a larger role in regulation and enforcement of bureaus?
The Center for Internet and Society (CIS) is a public interest technology law and policy program at Stanford Law School and a part of Law, Science and Technology Program at Stanford Law School. CIS brings together scholars, academics, legislators, students, programmers, security researchers, and scientists to study the interaction of new technologies and the law and to examine how the synergy between the two can either promote or harm public goods like free speech, innovation, privacy, public commons, diversity, and scientific inquiry.
To celebrate the one-year anniversary of the Stanford Cryptography Policy Project, we are holding an afternoon event highlighting our research and accomplishments over the past year. As our keynote speakers, it is our pleasure to welcome the Honorable Stephen W. Smith, Magistrate Judge of the Southern District of Texas, and Paul S. Grewal, former Magistrate Judge of the Northern District of California.
After a lengthy legislative process, the GDPR is finally ready. As the most significant overhaul of data privacy laws in Europe in twenty years, it will have a profound impact on Silicon Valley technology companies offering online services in Europe. The recently announced Privacy Shield will affect most US organisations that receive personal information from Europe.