Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the
“Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act” (S. 754)

October 26, 2015

An open letter to the United States Senate:

We are professors who research and/or teach about cyberlaw and cybersecurity, and write to express our concerns about S. 754, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (the “Act”). In April, more than 60 technologists and computer and network security professionals wrote to express their concerns with the Act; we attach a copy of that letter below and echo the concerns raised in that letter, which can also be found at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/04/technologists-oppose-cisainformation-sharing-bills.

While recent amendments to CISA have attempted to address the significant privacy and surveillance concerns raised by the aforementioned technologists and others, the fundamental problem inherent in CISA remains. In sum, it will do little, if anything, to address the very real problem of flawed cybersecurity while creating conditions ripe for abuse. Among other infirmities, it would:

- Allow “voluntary” sharing of heretofore private information with the government, allowing secret and ad hoc privacy intrusions in place of meaningful consideration of the privacy concerns of all Americans. The Freedom of Information Act would be neutralized, while a cornucopia of federal agencies could have access to the public’s heretofore private-held information with little fear that such sharing would ever be known to those whose information was shared.

- Allow companies to attack cybersecurity threats, without clear limitations on their power or scope.

- Allow companies to do any and all of the above with little fear of facing legal consequences for poor judgment (or worse).

Most significantly, it would do all of the above while doing little to address actual cybersecurity concerns. Rather than encouraging companies to increase their own cybersecurity standards, CISA ignores that goal and offloads responsibility to a generalized public-private secret information sharing network. CISA creates new law in the wrong places. For example, as the attached letter indicates, security threat information sharing is already quite robust. Instead, what are most needed are more robust and meaningful private efforts to prevent intrusions into networks and leaks out of them, and CISA does nothing to move us in that direction.

In sum, this is a classic “let’s do something” law. While we laud Congress for taking notice of the significant cybersecurity threats facing US corporations, we fear that CISA will weaken privacy and
encourage governmental surveillance, with little upside for the public. We hope you will review the attached letter and vote against CISA.

For further information, questions or correspondence, please contact David S. Levine at dsl2@princeton.edu.

Very truly yours,

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/attachment
April 16, 2015

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Congressman Adam Schiff
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Congressman Michael McCaul
131 Cannon House Office Building
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RE: Cyber Threat Information Sharing Bills

Dear Senator Burr, Senator Feinstein, and Representatives Nunez, Schiff, and McCaul:

We are writing you today as technologists, academics, and computer and network security professionals who research, report on, and defend against Internet security threats. Among us are antivirus and threat signature developers, security researchers and analysts, and system administrators charged with securing networks. We have devoted our careers to building security technologies, and to protecting networks, computers, and critical infrastructure against a wide variety of even highly sophisticated attacks.

We do not need new legal authorities to share information that helps us protect our systems from future attacks. When a system is attacked, the compromise will leave a trail, and investigators can collect these bread crumbs. Some of that data empowers other system operators to check and see if they, too, have been attacked, and also to guard against being similarly attacked in the future. Generally speaking, security practitioners can and do share this information with each other and with the federal government while still complying with our obligations under federal privacy law.

Significantly, threat data that security professionals use to protect networks from future attacks is a far more narrow category of information than those included in the bills being considered by Congress, and will only rarely contain private information. In those rare cases, we generally scrub the data without losing the effectiveness of the threat signature.

These are some common categories of data that we share to figure out if systems have been compromised (indicators of compromise, or IoCs) and to mitigate future threats:
• Malware file names, code, and hashes
• Objects (code) that communicate with malware
• Compile times: data about the conversion of source code to binary code
• File size
• File path location: where on the computer system malware files are stored
• Registry keys: configuration settings for low-level operating system and applications
• Memory process or running service information

Attached to this letter is an actual example of a threat signature containing data that helps system administrators secure their networks. You’ll see that the information does not contain users’ private information.

Waiving privacy rights will not make security sharing better. The more narrowly security practitioners can define these IoCs and the less personal information that is in them, the better. Private information about individual users is often a detriment in developing threat signatures because we need to be able to identify an attack no matter where it comes from and no matter who the target is. Any bill that allows for and results in significant sharing of personal information could decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and make IoCs less actionable.

Further, sharing users’ private information creates new security risks. Here are just three examples: First, any IoC that contains personal information exacerbates the danger of false-positives, that innocent behavior will erroneously be classified as a threat. Second, distribution of private data like passwords could expose our users to unauthorized access, since, unfortunately, many people use the same password across multiple sites. Third, private data contained in personal emails or other messages can be abused by criminals developing targeted phishing attacks in which they masquerade as known and trusted correspondents.

For these reasons, we do not support any of the three information sharing bills currently under consideration—the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), or the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015. These bills permit overbroad sharing far beyond the IoCs described above that are necessary to respond to an attack, including all “harm” of an attack. This excess sharing will not aid cybersecurity, but would significantly harm privacy and could actually undermine our ability to effectively respond to threats.

As a general rule, when we do need to share addressing information, we are sharing the addresses of servers which are used to host malware, or to which a compromised computer will connect for the exfiltration of data. In these cases, this addressing information helps potential victims block malicious incoming connections. These addresses do not belong to subscribers or customers of the
victims of a security breach or of our clients whose systems we are helping to secure. Sharing this kind of addressing is a common current practice. We do not see the need for new authorities to enable this sharing.

Before any information sharing bill moves further, it should be improved to contain at least the following three features:

1. Narrowly define the categories of information to be shared as only those needed for securing systems against future attacks;
2. Require firms to effectively scrub all personally identifying information and other private data not necessary to identify or respond to a threat; and
3. Not allow the shared information to be used for anything other than securing systems.

We appreciate your interest in making our networks more secure, but the legislation proposed does not materially further that goal, and at the same time it puts our users’ privacy at risk. These bills weaken privacy law without promoting security. We urge you to reject them.

Sincerely,

Ben Adida

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Rich Kulawiec, Senior Internet Security Architect, Fire on the Mountain, LLC

Ryan Lackey; Product, CloudFlare, Inc
Ronald L. Larsen, Dean and Professor, School of Information Sciences, University of Pittsburgh

Christopher Liljenstolpe, Chief architect for AS3561 (at the time about 30% of the Internet backbone by traffic) and AS1221 (Australia’s main Internet infrastructure).

Ralph Logan, Partner, Logan Haile, LP

Robert J. Lupo, Senior Security Engineer "sales team", IBM inc.

Marc Maiffret, Former CTO BeyondTrust

Steve Manzuik, Director of Security Research, Duo Security

Ryan Maple. Information security professional.

Brian Martin, President, Open Security Foundation (OSF)

Morgan Marquis-Boire

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Andrew McConachie. Network engineer with experience working on Internet infrastructure.

Daniel L. McDonald, RTI Advocate and Security Point-of-Contact, illumos Project

Alexander McMillen, Mission critical datacenter and cloud services expert

Charlie Miller, Security Engineer at Twitter

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Joseph “Jay” Moran, Vice President of Cimpress Technology Operations

Peter G. Neumann, Senior Principal Scientist, SRI International
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Jesus Oquendo, Information Security Researcher, E-Fensive Security Strategies

Ken Pfeil, CISO, Pioneer investments

Benjamin C. Pierce, Professor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania
Ryan Rawdon, Network and Security Engineer

Bruce Schneier, security researcher and cryptographer, published seminal works on applied cryptography

Sid Stamm, Ph.D., Principal Engineer, Security and Privacy, Mozilla; Visiting Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

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