The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School is a leader in the study of the law and policy around the Internet and other emerging technologies.
Chris Sprigman and I have a new piece up at The Daily Beast about NSA illegal mass surveillance. This time we're looking at the role of the secret FISA Court, which is what the Administration always points to when it tries to assure Americans that there are no dangers from the emerging NSA Panopticon.
Lawmakers in Washington are again weighing in on who should and should not qualify as a journalist—and the outcome looks pretty grim for bloggers, freelancers, and other non-salaried journalists.
Today the Mozilla Foundation joined an illustrious group of computer scientists and privacy researchers in an amicus brief the Center for Internet and Society filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Jonathan Mayer and I wrote the brief, arguing that weev's conviction in U.S. v.
Online stalking, harassment, and invasions of privacy can be incredibly destructive. Yet very little empirical data exisits regarding these incidents. This paucity of data hinders educational, support, research and policy efforts. Without My Consent, a non-profit organization seeking to combat online invasions of privacy, is conducting research to better understand the experiences of online harassment. If you are 18 or older and have experienced harassment on the Internet, please consider taking their survey.
We at the Center for Internet and Society are writing an amicus brief on Weev's behalf. Signatories must join by JULY 5th. Email me if you want to be a signatory on the brief. My email is jennifer at law dot stanford dot edu.
That brief will argue as follows:
This morning, the NY Times posted my op-ed, co-authored with CIS affiliate scholar Chris Sprigman, arguing that the two federal statutes the Obama Administration has pointed to as authorizing NSA mass surveillance of our phone calls, emails, chats, social networking, etc. -- the FISA Amendments Act and the Patriot Act -- don't actually authorize the NSA's conduct.
Every tool can be misused, and potential harms from such misuse are often checked through force of law. Information technology is no different. To consider regulating information technology through use of the tool metaphor, we need to first consider the dynamics of information technology regulation in general. This blog post addresses key aspects of information technology regulation: how regulation is at once incapable of fully addressing the potential harms that flow from misuse of information technology, but powerful nonetheless in shaping how information technology tools are built and used.