The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School is a leader in the study of the law and policy around the Internet and other emerging technologies.
My recently completed article presents steps that governments can take now to encourage the development, deployment, and use of automated road vehicles. After providing technical and legal context, it describes key administrative, legal, and community strategies. It concludes by urging policymakers to facilitate automated driving in part by expecting more from today’s drivers and vehicles.
The FBI demand for access to a locked iPhone by compelling Apple to write new software to undo its security features has sucked the oxygen out of the surveillance-privacy debate over the last few weeks. So much is this the case that coverage of the markup of H.R. 699, the Email Privacy Act, tentatively scheduled for March 22, seems sure to be lost in the oral argument on Apple’s case, which is scheduled to be heard the same day. But the Email Privacy Act is incredibly important and it deserves attention.
Tracking the institutional response of state and local governments to cyber threats is relatively tough in many cases. Security concerns, rapid changes, and limited transparency all collectively make finding official and primary sources challenging. As such, when there are useful data sources to help understand these issues, they’re worthy of note. One such set of data comes from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Annual Fusion Center Assessmen
The Department of Justice (DoJ) filed its response yesterday to Apple's motion to vacate the court’s order that directed Apple to write new code and certify it to circumvent a security feature configured to prevent access to a device. Reaction to the tone and DoJ analysis was swift, and it highlights the stakes of the case for both sides.
The Spanish Supreme Court (TS) has recently ruled on the legality of using someone else’s trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored ads in Google Adwords. The case is Maherlo v Charlet (pdf, in Spanish).
Much consideration has been given to the role of tools in recruitment to extremist violence, the desirability of restricting the use of tools for those purposes, the collateral effects of such restrictions, and the opportunity to use tools for alternative narratives.
This blog concludes that in some cases, restrictions on such uses can be desirable. At the same time though, with few exceptions, the choice of such restrictions should be left to the private sector, and carried out in a way that advances liberal principles. Moreover, there is unlikely to be a solely technological solution to the problem of radicalization or its products, including planning of terrorist attacks. Ultimately, it may be people rather than tools, that are the most effective resource for curtailing extremist violence.
Right now, all eyes are on Riverside, California, where a federal magistrate judge issued an unprecedented and dangerous order to Apple on February 16 compelling the company to create and cryptographically sign a special, crippled version of its iOS software that disables certain iPhone security features.
The FBI investigates a grizzly murder. You are a bank president. The murderer stored his phone book in your bank's safety deposit box, the code for which is encrypted with copyrighted proprietary software, before he committed the murder. The FBI demands that you provide it with the master code for the box, which can be used to unlock other boxes, too. You can give the FBI the code, but should you? Apple CEO Tim Cook is asking himself the same question, his answer is rightly "no."