This blog post will briefly discuss the ruling’s relevance for future EU legislation, and in particular for the Terrorist Content Regulation. TL;DR: Glawischnig-Piesczek does not discuss when a filtering order might be considered proportionate or consistent with fundamental rights under the EU Charter. It only addresses the eCommerce Directive, holding that a monitoring injunction is not “general” — and thus is not prohibited under the Directive — when it “does not require the host provider to carry out an independent assessment” of filtered content. This interpretation of the eCommerce Directive opens the door for lawmakers to require “specific” machine-based filtering. But it seemingly leaves courts unable to require platforms to bring human judgment to bear by having employees review and correct filters’ decisions. That puts the eCommerce Directive in tension with both fundamental rights and EU lawmakers’ stated goals in the Terrorist Content Regulation. Read more about The CJEU’s new filtering case, the Terrorist Content Regulation, and the future of filtering mandates in the EU
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