Riana Pfefferkorn is the Cryptography Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Her work, made possible through funding from the Stanford Cyber Initiative, focuses on investigating and analyzing the U.S. government's policy and practices for forcing decryption and/or influencing crypto-related design of online platforms and services, devices, and products, both via technical means and through the courts and legislatures. Riana also researches the benefits and detriments of strong encryption on free expression, political engagement, economic development, and other public interests.
Prior to joining Stanford, Riana was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she worked on litigation and counseling matters involving online privacy, Internet intermediary liability, consumer protection, copyright, trademark, and trade secrets and was actively involved in the firm's pro bono program. Before that, Riana clerked for the Honorable Bruce J. McGiverin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She also interned during law school for the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Riana earned her law degree from the University of Washington School of Law and her undergraduate degree from Whitman College.
High Res Photo of Riana Pfefferkorn
In the upcoming version of the Apple iPhone iOS operating system, iOS 12, the phone’s Lightning cable port (used for charging and data transmission) will be disabled an hour after the phone is locked. The device will still charge, but transferring data to or from the device via the Lightning cable will require entering the device’s password first.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.
- Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"
Arguing that if the court should not compel Apple to create software to enable unlocking and search of the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, it will jeopardize digital and personal security more generally.
Included in this PDF are:
- Petitioners' Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to file Motion for Reconsideration
- Exhibit A Petitioners' [Proposed] Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration of the May 1, 2018 Order
- Declaration of Jennifer Stisa Granick in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration
- [Proposed] Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Local Rule 7-9.
Which would you prefer: keeping your valuables in a locked safe, or keeping them in a shoebox and trusting that everyone will adhere to laws against theft and their concomitant penalties? Most, if not all, of us will choose the former. That’s so even if we realize that safe-crackers may ultimately find a way someday to bust open even the most top-of-the-line safe currently on offer.
Abstract. Federal law enforcement officials in the United States have recently renewed their periodic demands for legislation to regulate encryption. While they offer few technical specifics, their general proposal—that vendors must retain the ability to decrypt for law enforcement the devices they manufacture or communications their services transmit—presents intractable problems that would-be regulators must not ignore.
Last week, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein gave a speech about encryption that prompted a considerable amount of well-deserved blowback. His speech rehashed a number of long-discredited technical proposals for “solving” the “going dark” problem, and it also misstated the law.
"Ms Riana Pfefferkorn, Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society in the USA, argued that while governments suggest companies should live up to their responsibilities, it remains unclear what exactly these responsibilities are. Internet companies have responsibilities towards Internet users as well as to law enforcement. For Pfefferkorn, the debate on weakening encryption is over, since the technology is out there for anyone.
"In this excerpt from an interview on Law.com’s “Unprecedented” podcast, Stanford Law cryptography fellow Riana Pfefferkorn talks about the Department of Justice’s new push for “responsible encryption” and whether it could lead to new legislation.
"“It’s basically the gloves coming off,” said Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at Stanford University’s Center for Internet and Society.
"Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, said the phone could contain information not available elsewhere, like data stored and deleted locally, but in this case she doesn’t see the point.
“I don’t think this is a case where that would be forensically significant,” Pfefferkorn said of accessing the phone."
""Contrary to Rosenstein's inflammatory digs, strong encryption does help prevent crime, such as identity theft -- something 'responsible' companies need to worry about at a time when massive data breaches regularly dominate the headlines," said Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at Stanford Law School.
Widespread availability of advanced encryption technology has improved security for consumers and businesses. But as digital products and services have become more secure, some in the law enforcement and intelligence communities have voiced concerns that encryption inhibits their ability to prevent terrorism and prosecute crimes. For example, the Department of Justice is exploring a potential legal mandate requiring companies to design their technologies to allow law enforcement to access consumer data during criminal investigations.
When you give sites and services information about yourself, where does it go? Who else will get hold of it, and what will they use it for? The recent revelations about Cambridge Analytica's acquisition of data about tens of millions of Facebook users without their knowledge or consent have prompted renewed interest in how data about us gets shared, sold, used, and misused -- well beyond what we ever expected. Join us for a SLATA/CIS lunchtime conversation with three experts from Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society as we discuss the legal and policy implications of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and responses from Congress and courts. How can we prevent this from happening again? What new problems might we create through poorly-crafted legal responses?
CIS Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn will be speaking on a panel on "Cryptography and Ethics"at the 2018 Cybersecurity Law Symposium. Leading experts from academia and industry will discuss the legal and policy issues that arise from the latest developments in cybersecurity. This event is open to the public, but registration is required.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn will be speaking at the 2018 InfoSec Southwest.
Encryption shields private information from malicious eavesdroppers. After years of slow adoption, encryption is finally becoming widespread in consumer-oriented electronic devices and communications services. Consumer-oriented encryption software is now more user-friendly, and much of it turns on encryption by default. These advances enhance privacy and security for millions of people.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn was a guest on the WashingTech Policy Podcast with Joseph Miller.
"While the battle against encryption has been going on within federal law enforcement circles (dubbed "going dark") since at least the early 1990s, Rosenstein has now called for "responsible encryption."
Lecture held during the First International Congress of Fundamental Rights and Criminal Procedure in the Digital Age, organized by InternetLab in partnership with the Faculty of Law of the University of São Paulo.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn gave a lecture titled "The American debate on surveillance and encryption".