Riana Pfefferkorn is the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Her work, made possible through funding from the Stanford Cyber Initiative, focuses on investigating and analyzing the U.S. government's policy and practices for forcing decryption and/or influencing crypto-related design of online platforms and services, devices, and products, both via technical means and through the courts and legislatures. Riana also researches the benefits and detriments of strong encryption on free expression, political engagement, economic development, and other public interests.
Prior to joining Stanford, Riana was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she worked on litigation and counseling matters involving online privacy, Internet intermediary liability, consumer protection, copyright, trademark, and trade secrets and was actively involved in the firm's pro bono program. Before that, Riana clerked for the Honorable Bruce J. McGiverin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She also interned during law school for the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Riana earned her law degree from the University of Washington School of Law and her undergraduate degree from Whitman College.
High Res Photo of Riana Pfefferkorn
Today was the deadline for the public to submit comments on the Australian government's draft Assistance and Access Bill 2018. The proposed legislation drew sharp criticism from numerous tech companies and civil society groups, in Australia and elsewhere, for the threats it poses to computer security, human rights, due process, and transparency.
Encryption helps human rights workers, activists, journalists, financial institutions, innovative businesses, and governments protect the confidentiality, integrity, and economic value of their activities. However, strong encryption may mean that governments cannot make sense of data they would otherwise be able to lawfully access in a criminal or intelligence investigation.
Arguing that if the court should not compel Apple to create software to enable unlocking and search of the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, it will jeopardize digital and personal security more generally.
Motion to unseal the docket and court's legal reasoning in a sealed case wherein the Department of Justice allegedly sought to compel Facebook to comply with a wiretap order for Facebook's end-to-end encrypted voice calling app, Messenger.
Letter to Australia's Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) regarding a proposed "compromise" version of the Assistance and Access Bill.
Supplemental comments submitted to Australia's Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) on the revised draft (20 September 2018 version) of the Telecommunication & Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance & Access) Bill 2018, in advance of testimony during the PJCIS's 16 November 2018 hearing on the Bill.
Comments submitted to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) of the Australian Parliament on the revised draft (20 September 2018 version) of the Telecommunication & Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance & Access) Bill 2018.
Comments submitted to the Australian Government's Department of Home Affairs on its exposure draft of the Assistance and Access Bill 2018.
"3. How to push back against law enforcement requests
"SEASON - Is there a secure and democratic way to circumvent end-to-end encryption without violating users' privacy?
3 perguntas para Riana Pfefferkorn, pesquisadora na área de criptografia no Center for Internet and Society da Stanford Law School (EUA).
“O debate sobre a criptografia versus aplicação da lei é um debate ‘segurança versus segurança’, não um debate ‘privacidade versus segurança’”
Sobre fontes alternativas de investigação
"Riana Pfefferkorn, the cryptography fellow at Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society, told BuzzFeed News that it’s become standard for both parties to talk about a balance between privacy and law enforcement needs, without taking a real position on encryption.
“The most troublesome part of this is where it seems to characterize encryption as being, in and of itself, a weapon that can be used ‘to harm us,’” she said. “Given the crucial role of strong encryption in the modern economy, calling encryption a ‘weapon’ is a framing we can’t afford to return to.”"
"“That’s kind of a do-nothing idea for me,” said Riana Pfefferkorn, a cryptography fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. “It seems like you’re just kicking the can down the road with a commission.”
Pfefferkorn said Congress needs to settle the debate once and for all with a national policy in support of strong encryption that declares the technology to be good for national security, the economy and civil liberties."
Advanced technologies are revolutionizing how the government investigates, charges and prosecutes criminal cases—and defense attorneys must keep pace. Even small police departments can purchase powerful surveillance technologies, and internet companies collect vast troves of data on virtually everyone. This two-day CLE conference will discuss the government's use of technologically advanced investigative techniques in criminal cases, and the issues raised by those techniques under the Fourth Amendment and other federal law.
New software tools use artificial intelligence to create realistic-looking but fake videos of real people seeming to say and do things they never did. These so-called "deepfakes" will soon cause a number of problems for the courts, particularly when it comes to authenticating evidence in litigation. They may even undermine the justice system by eroding juries' belief in the knowability of what is real. Come discuss the implications of deepfakes for trial practice with CIS Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity Riana Pfefferkorn.
Since its start in 2001, the SF ISACA Fall Conference continues to be the premier education event for information technology audit, security, governance, risk and compliance professionals in Northern California. The SF ISACA Fall conference features five tracks packed with top flight speakers and cutting edge topics. CIS's Riana Pfefferkorn and Ryan Singel will be speaking at the event.
For more information visit the conference website.
Widespread availability of advanced encryption technology has improved security for consumers and businesses. But as digital products and services have become more secure, some in the law enforcement and intelligence communities have voiced concerns that encryption inhibits their ability to prevent terrorism and prosecute crimes. For example, the Department of Justice is exploring a potential legal mandate requiring companies to design their technologies to allow law enforcement to access consumer data during criminal investigations.
We're yet to see the details of the deal between the Government and Labor which would allow the passage of laws to give police and investigators access to encrypted messages.
That leaves one more day in this sitting of Parliament to get the laws through, after the Government claimed there was an urgent need to do so before Christmas.
Riana Pfefferkorn is a digital security expert and Cryptography Fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. She says that we are living in the “Golden Age of Surveillance,” in which the growing ubiquity of data-rich smart devices has produced a fundamental tension between the rights of users to protect their personal data and the needs of law enforcement to investigate or prevent serious crimes.
Cryptography Fellow Riana Pfefferkorn was a guest on the WashingTech Policy Podcast with Joseph Miller.