Jeffrey L. Vagle is Lecturer in Law and Executive Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. His research interests include surveillance law, cryptography and cybersecurity law, electronic privacy, Internet architecture, and networked economies and societies. A particular focus of his work is the study of the societal, political, historical, and economic effects of government surveillance, especially among marginalized or disenfranchised populations. Mr. Vagle writes and speaks regularly on privacy, data security, surveillance, and other cyberlaw-related topics, and is the author of several law review and technical articles, including, most recently, “Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveillance,” forthcoming in the Indiana Law Journal. He earned his JD from Temple University School of Law, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. Mr. Vagle is also a veteran, serving in both the U.S. Marine Corps as an infantry non-commissioned officer and in the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer.
The extended DDoS attacks over the past few days that triggered widespread outages and Internet congestion are more than a mere annoyance. Rather, these instances have proven to be increasingly sophisticated efforts to strike at core networking protocols—the infrastructure that makes the Internet operate—to render large portions of the network inoperable or inaccessible. Perhaps the greatest irony of these complex attacks has been the fact that they have been conducted on the backs of some of the dumbest devices out there—the so-called "smart" devices that make up the Internet of Things (IoT).
In her concurring opinion in US v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), Justice Sonia Sotomayor brought up a crucial point regarding a democracy's natural acceptance or resistance to government surveillance. As you may recall, the Court in Jones addressed whether the government's attachment of a GPS tracking device to someone's car in order to continuously monitor their movements constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Among the principles that govern the current state of technology, two stand out as fundamental to our understanding of the information security problem. First, software is everywhere. The technology we adopt at an exponentially increasing rate is nearly always software at its core.
Recently, Orin Kerr and I had a brief conversation on Twitter regarding the Fourth Amendment and the content/non-content distinction. Specifically, Orin asked those of us who subscribe to the mosaic theory of intelligence if some large amount of metadata can become content, can some small amount of content become metadata by the same logic?
The path from Laquan McDonald’s summary execution by Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke to the reluctant release — over a year later — by the Chicago Police Department of video of the killing shines yet another spotlight on the disproportionate use of force by police against young black men and women and the failure of authorities to identify and punish this behavior.
In William Gibson's latest novel, "The Peripheral," he imagines a future in which people have the ability to effortlessly encrypt spoken conversations in real time, in ways that are unbreakable to the artificial intelligences deployed by governments to eavesdrop on everyone.
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution seems straightforward on its face: At its core, it tells us that our “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are to be protected against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Before any government agent can perform a search or seizure, they must first obtain a warrant, based on “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
""When you do hear about lawsuits with respect to photos on social media, it usually is in a civil action," Professor Jeffrey Vagle, executive director of the Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, told NBC News. "This is a big deal because it is a criminal action.""
"Cases in which prosecutors have signaled interest in the Apple tool, or one like it, continue to pile up. In Manhattan, for instance, the district attorney’s office says it holds 205 encrypted iPhones that neither it nor Apple can currently unlock, up from 111 in November. Such pent-up demand for the tool spells danger, said Andrea Matwyshyn, a professor of law and computer science at Northeastern University, since its widespread dissemination presents a clear threat to the security of innocent iPhone users.
"“The government is making the argument that the past is prologue” even though technology has changed, said Jeffrey Vagle, executive director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Law School."
"Indeed, the act wasn’t meant to lead to new lawmaking, said Jeffrey Vagle, executive director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. One could argue that compelling a company to produce something -- code, for instance -- effectively does just that.
Ours is a time of ubiquitous surveillance. Our actions online and in public are routinely monitored, both with and without our consent, using the “smart” devices we’ve embraced as the tools of modern self-expression, connectivity, and convenience. This is the age of the biometrically quantified self, mass governmental telecommunications surveillance, location-aware technologies, marketing analytics, drones, and Big Data.